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Abstract
Many asset pricing anomalies imply the existence of time-varying pre-
dictable excess returns, as well as short-run underreaction and long-run
overreaction to news. The presence of short-sales constraints or of missper-
c e p t i o nh a sb e e no f t e ni n v o k e dt oe x p l a i ns u c hp a t t e r n s . I nt h i sp a p e rI
present a ‘mixed optimal/robust’ model with rational agents that hold no
missperception and face no borrowing constraints. In equilibrium, agents
do not borrow as much as they could, and ﬁlter news in ways that are consis-
tent with the anomalies mentioned above. We use the model to rationalize
the forward premium puzzle.
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Many asset pricing anomalies imply the existence of time-varying predictable ex-
cess returns, as well as short-run underreaction and long-run overreaction to news.
The presence of short-sales constraints or of missperception has been often in-
voked to explain such patterns. In this paper I present a ‘mixed optimal/robust’
model with rational agents that hold no missperception and face no borrowing
constraints. In equilibrium, agents do not borrow as much as they could, and
ﬁlter news in ways that are consistent with the anomalies mentioned above. We
use the model to rationalize the forward premium puzzle.
The idea behind this approach is that agents maximize expected utility as in
standard models. However, they fear misspeciﬁcation. Thus, they subject their
optimization problem to a robustness constraint (RC). This constraint imposes
an upper bound on the rate at which returns can deteriorate as the amount of
misspeciﬁcation increases. The results are that even agents who maximize ex-
pected wealth and who face no short-sales constraints will: (a)choose their port-
folio within a closed set even in the presence of predictable excess returns (i.e.,
‘limits to arbitrage’arise in equilibrium); and (b)will use robust forecasting for-
mulas that are consistent with the misperception found in the data.
We use this setup to explain two anomalies in international ﬁnancial markets:
the forward premium puzzle (FPP) and delayed overshooting (DO). According to
the FPP countries with higher than usual interest rates, relative to the US, tend
to experience a subsequent appreciation of their currency relative to the US dollar.
The DO anomaly is less prevalent than the FPP. It implies that the exchange rate
often follows a hump-shape pattern in response to a monetary shock.
The empirical literature has shown that these anomalies cannot be explained
only in terms of time-varying risk premia. Empirical evidence indicates that sys-
tematic forecast errors on the part of market participants play an important role.
Although uncovering this link is an important step, it generates intriguing ques-
tions: why do agents systematically hold misperception? Can these misperception
be arbitraged away by savvier investors? These questions can be addressed by the
mixed optimal/robust setup.
In formulating the RC and solving the agent’s problem I use ‘robust control’
methods which have been developed during the last decade. The starting point
is the recognition that the models we use are simply approximations to the ‘true
model,’and there is no reason to maintain that the resulting misspeciﬁcation
patterns can be parametrized by a well speciﬁed probability distribution, as is
1done in the stochastic approach. A remarkable result is that for a very large
class of true models, one can represent misspeciﬁcations via unknown-but-bounded
disturbance sequences. An attractive property of robust control is that one can
obtain closed form solutions, which I use to compute the feasible portfolio set and
the robust forecasts.
In a mixed optimal/robust (O/R) setup investors have a well speciﬁed model
of the economy, but they take seriously into account that there might be model
misspeciﬁcation. As in rational expectations models, investors try to take advan-
tage of all proﬁt opportunities under a well speciﬁed probabilistic model of the
economy. However, as in robust models, they choose their portfolios subject to
a robustness constraint that requires that small, but unknown, misspeciﬁcations
don’t lead to large losses; and also requires that the performance of the portfolio
does not deteriorate too fast as the norm of uncertainty increases.1
In this setup, investors who face no short-sales constraints, who use the correct
model to form expectations, and whose objective is to maximize expected proﬁts
may choose not to take inﬁnite positions. We will show that under some parameter
restrictions investors will choose their portfolio within a closed and bounded set
(the Qt-set). That is, ‘limits to arbitrage’will arise endogenously from a desire for
robustness. Thus, when faced with a seemingly proﬁtable opportunity, an investor
will behave conservatively and not choose an overly large position.
The interesting aspect of the model is that, if it exists, the boundary of the
Qt-set is state-dependent: it is a function of the exchange rate realization, the
history of interest rate diﬀerentials, and the degree of required robustness. As a
result, the exchange rate has two functions: it determines the sign of expected
excess returns, as well as the boundary of the Qt-set.
Clearly, in situations in which the representative investor selects his portfolio at
the boundary of the Qt-set, expected excess returns can be positive. Furthermore,
if the degree of required robustness declines over time, there can be a negative
covariance between exchange rate changes and the interest rate diﬀerential, and
an unconditional delayed response of the exchange rate to interest rate shocks.
This rationalizes the foreign exchange anomalies alluded to above.
We formalize the preceding ideas by considering a ‘mixed O/R’economy in
which agents select their portfolios by wearing two hats. They wear a robust hat to
1As we shall see, the problem solved by agents does not require that proﬁts be greater than
a certain level under all circumstances, so it is not a constraint that only considers the worst
case scenario.
2construct the Qt-set of admissible portfolios under an ‘uncertain model’that allows
for misspeciﬁcation.2 They then wear an optimizing hat to select a portfolio within
that set in order to maximize expected proﬁts under a well speciﬁed ‘probabilistic
model.’In other words, agents select portfolios in a standard optimizing fashion
within a certain ‘Qt-set’. However, they do not consider portfolios outside this
Qt-set.3 This setup is similar to the ‘mixed H2/H∞’approach devel oped in the
control literature.
Since we are considering a multiperiod asset pricing problem, the probabilistic
model and the uncertain model used by an investor must contain conjectures of
how future exchange rates will be determined, as well as descriptions of the interest
rate diﬀerential process. This raises the issue of what is a reasonable equilibrium
concept in a mixed O/R economy? We propose one which is practically identical
to the standard competitive equilibrium of rational expectations. The only diﬀer-
ence is that we impose two, instead of just one, consistency requirement on the
agent’s conjectures.
The existing economics literature has dealt with uncertainty in two contrast-
ing ways. In the rational expectations literature all uncertainty is represented
probabilistically. In contrast, in the robust literature, uncertainty is represented
by sequences of totally unknown disturbances that satisfy certain norm bounds.4
Our methodological contribution is to pose and solve a multiperiod asset pric-
ing problem in which both optimizing and robustness considerations are present.
This approach is a compromise between standard rational expectations models,
which assume away any potential misspeciﬁcation, and robust models, which force
agents to be overly conservative.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present a brief outline
of the argument. In Section 3 we present a simple rational expectations model that
will serve as a benchmark. In Section 4 we consider the mixed O/R economy and
solve for the equilibrium. In Section 5 we show how the equilibrium exchange rate
process can rationalize the foreign exchange market anomalies. In Section 6 we
present a review of the literature. Lastly, we present the proofs in the Appendix.
2The main diﬀerence between robust models and rational expectations models is that in the
former consider misspeciﬁcations that need not be parametrized in a probabilistic way.
3As we shall see, the desire for robustness does not imply that agents are inactive in the
market and simply stay in bed. The problem that agents solve in order to compute the Rt-set
does not require that excess returns be greater than a certain level under all circumstances, so
it is not a constraint that considers a simple minded worst case scenario.
4See the next subsection for a review of the literature.
32. Outline
We start in Section 3 with a simple benchmark model in which the exchange rate
is determined by the uncovered interest parity condition. Agents can borrow and
lend freely a domestic bond as well as a foreign bond, and their objective is to
maximize expected proﬁts. In this setup the expected depreciation of domestic
currency must equal the interest rate diﬀerential
Et(ft+1) − ft = rt − r
f
t (2.1)
where ft is the log exchange rate. Like in rational expectations models, in order to
allow the agent to compute Et(ft+1), it is assumed that the interest rate diﬀerential
rt − r
f
t := yt follows a well speciﬁed stochastic process. Thus, agents can use
Bayes law in combination with knowledge of the model to compute Et(ft+1). The
equilibrium ft is then obtained by solving (2.1) recursively.
It is well known that foreign exchange market anomalies cannot be explained
by standard rational expectation models like the one we have just described. If one
introduces risk aversion, the same holds true unless risk aversion is unreasonable
high. In this paper we take a diﬀerent route to generate time varying predictable
excess returns.
The mixed O/R economy of Section 4 is meant to capture the fact that real
world investors frequently refrain from taking overly large positions even if ex-
pected excess returns are high. To make the analysis simple and sharp, we consider
practically the same setup as in Section 3: an agent that faces no short-selling
constraints maximizes expected proﬁts subject to a robustness constraint (RC),
that we will describe below.
The basic methodological departure from the existing literature is that we
endow the agent with two models of the economy: a ‘probabilistic model’under
which he estimates the mathematical expectation of excess returns and chooses
the optimal portfolio, and an ‘uncertain model’under which he computes what
we call the Qt-set of admissible portfolios that satisﬁes the RC.
The uncertain model resembles the benchmark model of Section 3, except
that it includes dynamic misspeciﬁcation patterns that are taken to be unknown.
These misspeciﬁcation sequences are only required to be square summable.
In contrast, the probabilistic model parametrize uncertainty. The interest rate
diﬀerential as well as the exchange rate follow well speciﬁed stochastic processes.
That is, under the probabilistic model the agent knows how Qt+i-sets will be com-
puted in the future and knows that the t+i’s exchange rates may be determined
4at the boundary or in the interior of the Qt+i-set.
The RC is deﬁned by Problem R. Loosely speaking, the RC requires that
small misspeciﬁcation do not lead to large losses, but permits large losses in the
presence of huge misspeciﬁcation. In other words, the RC requires that as the
norm of uncertainty grows, excess returns deteriorate at a rate no greater than a
number γ>0.
During each period the agent observes the exchange rate ft and past interest
rate diﬀerentials yt and solves the so called Problem O/R: maximize expected
proﬁts under the probabilistic model, subject to the constraint that the portfolio
satisﬁes the RC under the uncertain model.
Since we are departing from the traditional rational expectations framework,
we must address the issue of an appropriate equilibrium concept in a mixed O/R
economy. The equilibrium concept we will propose is practically identical to the
standard competitive equilibrium of rational expectations except for one diﬀer-
ence. Typically in rational expectations models there is a consistency requirement
that the conjecture of future prices must be conﬁrmed by the future equilibrium
price function. In a mixed O/R economy there are two consistency requirements,
stemming from the fact that the agent can choose a portfolio in the interior or on
the boundary of the Qt-set, which in turn is derived under the uncertain model.
We ask three questions. First, when will an agent in a mixed O/R economy
choose not to take inﬁnite positions? Second, under which circumstances can
there be predictable excess returns in equilibrium? Finally, can we generate time-
varying patterns of predictable excess returns that rationalize the foreign exchange
market anomalies we listed in the Introduction?
To address these issues we construct Markov equilibria in two steps. First,
we characterize the Qt-set and determine the conditions under which it is closed
and bounded. Then, we construct an equilibrium exchange rate path that ensures
market clearing at all times.
In order for ‘limits to arbitrage’to arise from a desire for robustness, and the
intuitive story we described above to go through, the Qt-set must be non-empty,
closed and bounded. Proposition 4.1 provides necessary and suﬃcient conditions
on primitive parameters for this to be the case. Furthermore, it characterizes the
boundary of the Qt-set in terms of a quadratic equation. This will turn out to be
key in ﬁnding a closed-form solution for the exchange rate.
Whether or not the agent will choose his portfolio in the interior or at the
boundary of the Qt-set depends on the sign of the expected excess returns. The
expectation is computed using the equilibrium exchange rate process, which is
5characterized by Proposition 4.3.
In order to rationalize the foreign exchange market anomalies it is necessary to
have time-varying predictable excess returns along the equilibrium path. This is
possible because the boundary of the Qt-set is state-dependent. It is determined
by the current exchange rate, the interest rate diﬀerential’s history, the robust
forecasts made by agents, and by the required degree of robustness.
Proposition 5.1 identiﬁes suﬃcient conditions for expected excess returns to be
time varying and strictly positive over a certain time interval. That is, the upper
boundary of the Qt-set equals the supply of the domestic bond (S) and expected
excess returns are positive. One of these restrictions is that the degree of required
robustness declines over time.
In Section 5 we present simulations that show that if agents behave in the
way we have just described, and ft is as characterized in Proposition 5.1, then it
possible for the exchange rate path that clears the market to be consistent with
the foreign exchange market anomalies we alluded to above.
An appealing property of the model is that as the degree of robustness is
reduced, the robust forecasts converge to the rational expectations forecasts and
the boundaries of the Qt-set vanish. As a result, in the limit, the equilibrium
exchange rate function converges to the rational expectations one.
3. The Benchmark Economy
In this section we present a simple rational expectations model in which the ex-
change rate is determined by the celebrated uncovered interest parity condition.
Our objective is to have a familiar benchmark. In latter sections we will use
this benchmark to evaluate the eﬀects of introducing model uncertainty and ro-
bustness considerations, as well as to illustrate the issues involved in deﬁning an
equilibrium in a mixed O/R setup. Some readers may wish to skip this section
as the material is standard.
Consider a representative agent who can invest in either a domestic bond or a
foreign bond. A domestic bond purchased at time t pays exp(rt) units of domestic
currency at t +1 , while a foreign bond pays exp(r∗
t) units of foreign currency.
There is a ﬁxed supply of the domestic bond equal to S ≥ 0, while the foreign
bond has a perfectly elastic supply.
Uncertainty originates from the fact that the interest rate diﬀerential (yt :=
rt − r∗
t) is random. In this section we will assume that this uncertainty can be
parametrized in terms of the following stochastic process.
6yj = xj + σv˜ vj,j = {1,...,T}
xj+1 = axj + σw ˜ wj,x 0 =0 , |a| < 1
(3.1)
The disturbances are independent and identically distributed. For each j, the
disturbance ˜ vj is a realization of a random variable that has a standard normal
distribution. Furthermore, ˜ vj ∈R. The same holds true for ˜ wj.
According to (3.1) the interest rate diﬀerential is hit by transitory as well
as persistent disturbances. However, the agent cannot distinguish one from the
other. At time t he observes only the history {yj}
t
j=1 := yt, and additionally
knows that the eﬀect of a persistent disturbance on yt decays at rate a.5
We will denote the log exchange rate by ft. As usual, an increase in ft cor-
responds to a depreciation of the domestic currency. We close the model by
postulating that there is a ﬁnal time T +1 , at which yT+1 =0and fT+1 is ex-
ogenously given by βT+1 ∈R. We assume that βT+1 is a realization of a random
variable with a ﬁnite ﬁrst moment.
Like in standard rational expectations models, to ensure that the representa-
tive agent can compute the mathematical expectation of excess returns, in addition
to knowledge about (3.1), we endow him with a model of how future exchange
rates will be determined. We assume that the conjecture has a Markovian form:
˜ f
B
t+i(b)=b1,t+iyt+i + b2,t+iEt+i(xt+i+1)+b3,t+i,t + i ≤ T (3.2)
In equilibrium the parameter vector b∗ must be such that the conjecture is con-
sistent with the equilibrium exchange rate function.
For further reference we state the problem solved by the representative agent.
Problem O. Given the current exchange rate ft and history {yj}
t
j=1, choose a
portfolio, qt ∈ R, in order to maximize the expected value of next period’s
wealth, under the interest rate diﬀerential process (3.1), and the conjectured
next period’s exchange rate function.
In the benchmark economy an equilibrium consists of a conjecture ˜ fB
t+1(bt+1),
an exchange rate function fB
t (yt; ˜ fB
t+1(bt+1)), and a portfolio strategy q∗
t(ft,y t),
such that during every period, taking the exchange rate as given q∗
t(ft,y t) solves
Problem O; the domestic bond market clears; and the conjecture is consistent:
5This state-space representation of the interest rate diﬀerential can be interpreted in terms
of the Dornbusch (1976) model.
7fB
t (yt; ˜ fB
t+1(b∗
t+1)) = ˜ fB
t (b∗
t) for all t ≤ T. That is, there is a ﬁxed point of the
mapping from the agent’s conjecture to the model that generates exchange rates.
This is simply the deﬁnition of equilibrium used in standard rational expectations
models.
The solution to Problem O entails taking inﬁnitely large short or long positions
unless there are no expected excess returns:
Et(ρt+1,f t): =ft − Et(ft+1)+yt =0 (3.3)
That is, in a risk-neutral setup expected devaluation equals the forward premium:
Et(fB
t+1) − ft = yt. This is the uncovered interest parity condition.6
In order to compute Et(ft+1) the agent uses the fact that yt is generated by
stochastic process (3.1), and that next period’s exchange rate will be given by
˜ fB
t+1(bt+1). Bayes law then implies that E(yt+i|y1,...,y t)=ai−1ˆ xt+1 where ˆ xt+1 is
given by the Kalman ﬁlter recursion7
ˆ xj+1 = aˆ xj + akj[yj − ˆ xj], ˆ x1 =0 . (3.4)
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t), and Ft is the exchange rate. Equation (3.3) follows by taking logs and setting yt :=
rt − r∗
t.
7To see this, note that each disturbance ˜ wj and ˜ vj belongs to the set of all possible realizations
of a random variable z ∼ N(0,1), except {−∞, ∞}. Moreover, Pr(z = −∞)=P r ( z =+ ∞)=0 .
8where,
βt = Et(βt+1) and φt =
1 − aT−t
1 − a
This function says that the exchange rate appreciates if there is an increase either
in the current interest rate diﬀerential or in the forecast of future diﬀerentials (i.e., ￿T−t
i=1 Et(yt+i)=
￿T−t
i=1 ai−1ˆ xt+1 = φtˆ xt+1). Since |a| < 1, (3.5) converges to the
familiar formula fB
t = βt −yt −
1
1−aˆ xt+1 for large T.
As is well known, this exchange rate determination model cannot explain the
most salient foreign exchange anomalies.
4. The ‘Mixed O/R’E c o n o m y
In the rational expectations model of Section 3 agents take an ‘on the average’
approach in selecting portfolios. Given the means and variances of disturbances,
agents make forecasts of future interest rates by setting future shocks equal to their
expected value (zero in our benchmark case). Thus, forecasts are Et(yt+j)=ajˆ xt.
The underlying assumption is that although future shocks might be very large in
absolute value, they will wash out and are uncorrelated.
The point of departure of the robust approach is that agents recognize the
possibility that there might be model misspeciﬁcation. This might arise from
modeling errors, parameter variation, etc. In a robust setup agents make forecasts
using a ‘guaranteed relative performance’approach instead of an on the average
approach. An important method to tackle robustness issues that was developed
during the 1980s is the so called H∞-control.
In this paper we consider a hybrid optimal/robust setup in which agents, who
can borrow and lend freely optimally select their portfolio from a set that satisﬁes
a certain robustness constraint. The idea is that agents want to ensure that small
but unknown misspeciﬁcations don’t lead to large losses. Thus, when faced with
a seemingly proﬁtable opportunity, they will behave conservatively and will not
choose an overly large position. As we shall see, the desire for robustness does not
imply that agents are inactive in the market and simply stay in bed.8
We implement this idea by posing a mixed O/R problem in which an agent has
two models of the economy: an ‘uncertain model’under which he computes what
8We would like to emphasize at the outset that the robustness constraint will not require that
realized proﬁts be greater than a certain level under all circumstances, so it is not a constraint
that only considers the worst case scenario.
9we will call the Qt-set of admissible portfolios; and a ‘probabilistic model’under
which he estimates the mathematical expectation of excess returns and chooses
the optimal portfolio. The uncertain model allows for the existence of unknown
misspeciﬁcations. In contrast, the probabilistic model parametrizes uncertainty.
4.1. The Uncertain Model
Agents construct the robust portfolio set by using an uncertain model of the
economy that allows for a quite general model uncertainty. In contrast to the
Bayesian approach this model uncertainty is not conﬁned to cases that can be
parametrized in a probabilistic way.
Since we are considering a multiperiod asset pricing problem, the agent’s un-
certain model must include representations of the interest rate diﬀerential process,
as well as of future exchange rates under the existence of unknown time-varying
misspeciﬁcations.
Consider ﬁrst the representation of the interest rate diﬀerential. The agent
takes the view that (3.1) is simply a linear approximation to the true process,
which might be a high order non-linear dynamic process. Since the true model
is unknown, there is no reason to believe that misspeciﬁcation patterns can be
represented by sequences of i.i.d. disturbances {˜ vj, ˜ wj} as in (3.1). Instead, the






j=0 , that allow for a very wide range of time-
varying misspeciﬁcations in the disturbances, as well as in the trend component.
That is, instead of (3.1) we now have yj = xj+∆v
j +σv˜ vj and xj+1 = a[1+∆a
j]xj+
∆w
j + σw ˜ wj. Thus, under the uncertain model9
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jσ−1
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Since there is a myriad of potential well-behaved true models, the agent allows
the misspeciﬁcation sequences to be unknown. The only requirement imposed on
9Throughout this paper we will consider unstructured unceratinty. We assume that the para-
meters (a,σw,σv) are knownand that the initial value of the unobservable state x1 is unknown.
We represent this uncertainty by setting x0 =0 , so that x1 is given by the ﬁrst element of the
















2 < ∞, for s = {a,v,w} (4.2)
This is actually a weak requirement and allows for quite a large set of misspeciﬁ-




j =0for all j, then (4.1) reduces to the benchmark model (3.1).10
Let us consider now the representation of future exchange rates. In order to
ensure that it is not ‘anything goes’under the uncertain model, the conjecture is
restricted to have the same form as the equilibrium exchange rate function of the




t+i)=−yt+i − φt+iFt+i(xt+i+1)+ut+i, ||u||2,[1,T] < ∞ (4.3)
The ﬁrst term is equal to the one in (3.5), and the second term simply replaces
the conditional expectation Et+i(xt+i+1) in (3.5) by the robust state forecast
Ft+i(xt+i+1).11 The agent recognizes that the ﬁrst two terms in (4.3) are sim-
ply an approximation, or that several events that he does not anticipate might
take place (institutional changes, supply shocks, etc.). Since he is using a robust
method, he does not represent this uncertainty in a probabilistic way. Instead,
he represents this unmodelled uncertainty with an unknown disturbance sequence
uT, which is only required to be square-summable. Lastly, in order to forecast
next period’s exchange rate, the agent represents next period’s state forecast as
follows
Ft(Ft+1(xt+2)) = aFt(xt+1)+σwwt+1 (4.4)
where wt+1 is an unknown disturbance with ﬁnite energy.
Armed with the uncertain model (4.1)-(4.4), the agent determines the robust
portfolio set (Qt-set) by solving the following feasibility problem.
10To illustrate what we mean by unknown time-varying misspeciﬁcations suppose that the
true interest rate diﬀerential process has two state variables: ¯ yt =¯ x1,t +¯ x2,t, where ¯ x1,t+1 =




j} associated with the univariate representation in (4.1)
are quite complicated and highly correlated with the state.
11We could have also considered a conjecture with undetermined coeﬃcients: ˜ fu
t+i(yt+i)=
κ1,t+iyt+i + κ2,t+iFt+i(xt+i+1)+ut+i, and then determine the vectors κ that belong to an
equilibrium. As will become clear latter, doing that does not add any insights and would
comlicate notation.
11Problem R. Find the set of portfolios that satisfy the following ‘robustness con-
straint’ (RC):






for all non-zero disturbance sequences {ωj+1}t
j=0 ∈ l2,[0,t+1] that are consis-
tent with observations {yt,f t} under the uncertain model (4.1)-(4.4).








We would like to emphasize that by imposing the RC we are not assuming
the existence of self-imposed short-selling constraints (i.e., limits to arbitrage). In
fact, as we shall see, the Qt-set might be unbounded. Proposition 4.1 characterizes
this set and speciﬁes when is that limits to arbitrage will indeed arise.
It is not transparent what the Qt-set is by simple inspection because (4.5)
depends on disturbance sequences {ωj}
t+1
j=0 that are not known. Unlike the bench-
mark model, there is no probabilistic characterization of these disturbances. Thus,
we cannot use standard Bayesian ﬁltering. Instead, we will characterize the Qt-set
using H∞-control techniques.
Before solving this problem we will provide the economic intuition. Roughly
speaking, the RC requires that small misspeciﬁcations don’t lead to large proﬁt
losses, but permits bad portfolio performance in the presence of large misspec-
iﬁcations. In other words, the RC simply requires that the performance of the
portfolio does not deteriorate too fast as the amount of uncertainty increases. This
is much milder than requiring that the portfolio has a guaranteed performance
under all circumstances.
The term qt[ft − ft+1(ω)+yt] ≡ qtρt+1(ω) c a nb ei n t e r p r e t e da sa ni n d e xo f
realized excess returns. For instance, in the event of an exchange rate depreciation
in excess of the interest rate diﬀerential (ft+1−ft >y t), realized excess returns will
be positive if the portfolio is short in the domestic bond and long in the foreign
bond (i.e., qt < 0 and q
f
t > 0). The parameter m can be interpreted as an index
of desired excess returns. It can either be negative, positive or zero. Lastly, the
denominator in (4.5) is a measure of the amount of uncertainty. This uncertainty
12For any ﬁnite T, the unknown disturbance sequence {vj,w j}T
j=0 deﬁned by (4.1) belongs to
the l2,[0,T] space. This follows from the fact that l2,[0,T] is a linear space, (˜ vj, ˜ wj) ∈ l2,[0,T] and
∆s
j ∈ l2,[0,T ].
12can reﬂect misspeciﬁcation in either the interest rate diﬀerential process or in the
exchange rate formation mechanism. Unlike the benchmark model (3.1)-(3.2),
there might exist unknown misspeciﬁcations that cannot be parametrized (i.e.,
(4.1)-(4.4)).
It is important to note that the RC does not imply that under all circumstances
the realized excess returns index must exceed the desired level m! Obviously, the
RC holds if qtρt+1(ω) ≥ m. However, the RC requirement is much milder: when
there is very little misspeciﬁcation (i.e., ||ω||2
2,[0,t+1] → 0) the excess returns index
should not be too far below the desired level m. In contrast, when there is a lot of
uncertainty, the excess returns index can indeed be much lower than m. In this
latter case the RC simply requires that the index of realized excess returns should
not deteriorate at a rate greater than γ2
t as the disturbances’norm increases. This
is why γ
−1
t is an index of required robustness. As we shall see, this index will play
a key role. In the limit when γt →∞ , the equilibrium exchange rate function will
converge to the benchmark function (3.5).
For illustrative purposes let us interpret ||ω||2
2,[0,t+1] as an index of market
turmoil or uncertainty faced by all agents in a given market. Under this view
there is a sense in which the RC is consistent with the existence of certain payment
schemes for money managers based on relative performance. When the market is
in turmoil or in a trading range, many money managers will perform badly. In
these circumstances, an individual manager will not be penalized by his principal
if his portfolio does not perform well.
Second, under this view we can see that the RC does not imply that the
investor will ‘stay everyday in bed’and take no positions whatsoever, fearing that
no matter what he does, he will always lose. In fact, the opposite is true. On the
one hand, if qt were set to zero and ||ω||2
2,[0,t+1] → 0, then (4.5) would be violated:
a money manager that unilaterally kept out of a ‘clearly good market’might have
diﬃculties keeping his job. On the other hand, RC permits realized excess returns
to be quite low, and even negative if there is a lot of turmoil in the market.
Third, the RC is consistent with the notion that investors are unwilling to take
very large positions that might bankrupt them in normal times. As we shall see,
under some restrictions on parameters, the RC will be satisﬁed exactly when qt
belongs to a certain closed and bounded set Q
γ
t(ft,y t).
134.1.1. Diﬀerences Between Problem R and Standard H∞−Control
The name H∞-control derives from the fact that in the robust control litera-
ture the objective often considered is an H∞−norm.13 Using the notation of our







≤ γ2, where h(.) is a C1 function. In order to establish a
link between Hrc
t and Problem R, note that if {yj}
t
j=1 ￿=0 , the robustness con-







two objects, although similar, diﬀer in several respects.
First, in standard H∞−control the cost index hj(.) does not contain forward
looking variables. In contrast, in a portfolio selection problem it is essential to
include future prices. Since prices next period depend on prices during the period
following the next and so on, it is necessary to specify how it is that agents
represent forward looking variables. This is why we had to specify the so called
uncertain model (4.1)-(4.4).
Second, the summation in the numerator Hrc
t starts at j =1 , while the numer-
ator in He
t only contains current and future variables. This is because standard
H∞−control considers the cumulative cost. In contrast, in macroeconomics and
ﬁnance typically the past does not enter into the objective function of agents.
Thus, it does not make sense to start the summation in He
t’s numerator at j =1
if the problem is being solved at time j = t.
Third, the numerator in He
t is not squared like in Hrc
t . We could square it, but
that would not make a lot sense in a portfolio selection context. The idea behind
the RC is to ensure that realized excess returns are not too low in normal times.
Squaring the numerator would imply that the investor would not like proﬁts to
be too high in normal times! In engineering and in some economic problems the
objective is typically to minimize the distance to a certain target, or the eﬀort
used to control a system. Thus it makes sense to square the numerator.
13In particular, let Gχ be a linear operator that maps an input sequence {ωj}
t+1
j=0 to a certain
objective under control policy χ. The H∞ induced norm of the operator Gχ is then deﬁned as




where ￿ ω ￿2,[0,t+1] is the l2−norm of the sequence ω. The ‘optimal H∞ Problem’ is to determine
γ =i n f χ∈Q ￿G χω ￿∞, and to ﬁnd the control policy χ∗ that attains γ.
14Last, we have posed the problem as a feasibility problem. This is diﬀerent from
the so called ‘optimal H∞ Problem’which consists of ﬁnding the lowest possible
γ (i.e., γ = inf Hrc
t ), and the control policy that attains γ.
4.2. The Probabilistic Model
As we have seen, the uncertain model allows for misspeciﬁcation in the repre-
sentation of the interest rate diﬀerential as well as in the representation of next
period’s exchange rate. In contrast, the probabilistic model we are now going to
describe resembles the rational expectations model of Section 3. It parametrizes
all uncertainty in terms of known probability distributions, and it endows the agent
with knowledge of the process that generates futures exchange rates.14
Consider an agent who assumes that the interest rate diﬀerential is generated
by the benchmark process (i.e., (3.1)), and knows that during each period the
demand for the domestic bond may be set either at the boundary or in the interior
of the Qt-set. Furthermore, he knows the likelihood of each event. That is, he
knows that with some probability αt the exchange rate at time t will be such that
the boundary of the Qt-set will equal the supply of the domestic bond. Denoting
this exchange rate by f
H∞










Meanwhile, with probability 1 − αt the exchange rate at time t, fE
t (yt), will be














t −Et(ft+1)+yt. Like the rational expectations model of
Section 3, in order for the agent to be able to compute this expectation we need
to endow him with a conjecture of how future exchange rates will be determined.







t+i (ϕ)=ϕ1,t+iyt+i + ϕ2,t+iˆ xt+i+1 + ϕ3,t+i pr. αt+i
˜ fE
t+i(ψ)=ψ1,t+iyt+i + ψ2,t+iˆ xt+i+1 + ψ3,t+i pr. 1 − αt+i
(4.8)
14Recall that the agent estimates the expectation of excess returns and selects his portfolio
from the robust portfolio set under the probabilistic model.
15In equilibrium, the vectors ϕ and ψ must be such that the consistency requirement
listed below, in the deﬁnition of equilibrium, is satisﬁed.15
Summing up, under the probabilistic model the interest rate diﬀerential process
is given by (3.1) and the representation of future exchange rates is (4.8). Thus,
under the probabilistic model the expectation of t+1’s exchange rate using infor-
mation available at t is
Et[ft+1(ϕ,ψ)] = αt+1Et[ ˜ f
H∞
t+1 (ϕ;yt+1)]+ [1 − αt+1]Et[ ˜ fE
t+1(ψ;yt+1)].
4.3. The Agent’s Problem
The problem solved by the representative investor is a combination of the two
auxiliary problems we have deﬁned.
Problem O/R. Given the exchange rate ft and the history of interest rate dif-
ferentials {yj}
t
j=1 , choose a portfolio that solves Problem O under the prob-
abilistic model, subject to the constraint that the portfolio solves Problem R
under the uncertain model (i.e., it belongs to the Qt-set).
Here H∞-control is used to characterize the set of feasible portfolios, while
classical optimal control is used to select the ‘optimal portfolio.’We consider
that this problem captures the way in which real world money managers make
decisions. They exploit proﬁt opportunities as long as the portfolio is contained
within reasonable bounds. However, they will not contemplate taking overly large
positions, even though there are positive expected excess returns under some
baseline model. This is specially true in new markets where expected returns
can be very high, but they are unknown territory. Problem O/R allows the
investor to choose his portfolio in order to maximize his expected utility as long
as the portfolio he chooses is contained within the Qt-set. However, any portfolio
outside this set is not admissible to the investor even though it might have a higher
expected return under the probabilistic model. Note that Problem O/R implicitly
deﬁnes a class of lexicographic preferences for the representative investor.
4.4. Equilibrium Concept
We will consider an equilibrium concept that is practically identical to the stan-
dard competitive equilibrium of rational expectations models, like the one in Sec-
15As we shall see, in general it is not possible for the equilibrium exchange rate function to
equal f
H∞
t (yt) for all t, or equal fE
t (yt) for all t.
16tion 3, except for an additional consistency requirement.
Deﬁnition An equilibrium of the O/R economy is an exchange rate function
f∗




t+i) and ˜ fE
t+i(yt+i,φ
∗
t+i), a sequence αT
with αj ∈ [0,1], and a portfolio strategy q∗
t(ft,yt), such that for all t ∈ [1,T]:
1. Taking the exchange rate as given, q∗
t(ft,y t) solves Problem O/R.
2. There is market clearing: q∗
t(f∗
t (yt),yt)=S.









t (yt) pr. αt
fE
t (yt) pr. 1 − αt
(4.9)
where αt ∈ [0,1],f
H∞
t (yt) is deﬁned by (4.6) and fE
t (yt) by (4.7).





t (yt; ˜ fu
t+1) and ˜ fE
t (ψ
∗;yt)=fE
t (yt; ˜ f
H∞
t+1 , ˜ fE
t+1).
The new element in this deﬁnition is point (4). It says that exchange rate
realizations must conﬁrm the conjectures under which Et(ρt+1,f t) is computed.
Since the exchange rate function will equal either f
H∞
t or fE
t , two consistency
requirements are needed.
For illustrative purposes note that if, for all t, the robustness constraint were
totally relaxed (γt = ∞), then αt =0for all t. Consequently, the consistency
requirement would simply be f∗




t). Clearly, in this case fE
t (yt)
would equal the benchmark fB
t (yt) in (3.5).
4.5. The Robust Portfolio Set
In this subsection we solve Problem R. This entails estimating the set that contains
the unknown disturbance sequence ωt := (wt,v t). We do this by making use of
16In order to make explicit the fact that the agent constructs the Rt-set under the uncertain









t (yt; ˜ fu
t+1) and fE
t (yt+1) as fE
t (yt; ˜ f
H∞
t+i , ˜ fE
t+1).
17the fact that if {yj}
t
j=1 ￿= 0, the RC is satisﬁed if and only if
J(qt,y














subject to : xj + σvvj = yj,j =1 ,...,t (4.10)
Note that if the supremum in (4.10) is bounded and the maximizing sequence
{ωj}
t+1
j=0 is unique, then we can generate an H∞ estimate of the unobservable
state xt+1. This will allow us characterize the Qt-set in terms of only the current
exchange rate and past yj’s. As it stands, Problem (4.10) seems quite complicated
because disturbance sequences are not restricted to follow any speciﬁc process, and
can be highly correlated. We solve this problem in the Appendix by breaking it
into three simple sub-problems as in Tornell (2000), and Basar and Bernhard
(1991).
The basic idea behind the solution method is to assume temporarily that the
value of the state at t+1 (xt+1) equals a certain value x. The ﬁrst sub-problem is
to ﬁnd the maximally malevolent sequence of past disturbances (from the perspec-
tive of objective (4.10)) that are consistent with history {yj}t
j=1 and that bring
the unobservable state from x0 = 0 to the certain value x at time t +1 . The sec-
ond sub-problem determines the disturbance ωt+1 under the assumption that the
unobservable state xt+1 takes the value x. Lastly, the third sub-problem generates
the estimate of next period’s state Ft(xt+1) and exchange rate Ft(ft+1). This
decomposition can be carried out because the dynamic system we are considering
is Markovian.
The solution to problem (4.10) is given by the following two propositions. The
ﬁrst characterizes the Qt-set for a given forecast of the state. Proposition 4.2
provides the robust forecast of the state.
Proposition 4.1 (Rt-set). Given the exchange rate realization ft, and the inter-
est rate diﬀerential observations yt, a portfolio satisﬁes the robustness constraint











t − Λtqt + Mt+1 ≤ 0
￿
,
17The function lt+1(yt) isgiven by equation (7.9). It is part of the forward dynamic programing
value function that determines the H∞ estimates of {ωj+1}
t−1
j=0 : Wt+1(x)=−kt[x− ˆ xt]2 −lt+1.
















Λt ≡ ft + yt + φtFt(xt+1;qt),φ t ≡
1 − aT−t
1 − a
where Zt+1 is given by recursion (3.4).
• The Qt-set is non-empty if and only if Λ2
t ≥ Γt+1Mt+1.
• The Qt-set is closed and bounded if and only if Γt+1 ≥ 0.
This Proposition will prove to be quite useful because it has converted the RC
in Problem R into a simple condition that qt must satisfy. Namely, the Qt-set
consists of all qt’s such that the parabola J(qt,f t) is non-positive, as illustrated in
Figure A.
Two points are worth highlighting. First, Proposition 4.1 makes clear that
imposing the RC is not the same as assuming that there are limits to arbitrage.
In fact, when parameters are such that Γt+1 < 0, the agent can take inﬁnite
positions and still satisfy the RC (panel (b) of Figure A). Second, staying in bed
(i.e., having a zero position) is, in general, not compatible with the RC. Clearly,
whenever Mt+1 > 0, the Qt-set does not contain qt =0(panel (a) of Figure A).
The quadratic equation J(qt,f t) has very attractive properties. First, whether
it is convex in qt only depends on parameters, through Γt+1. Second, the current
exchange rate only enters through Λt. This implies that, if it exists, the boundary
of the Qt-set is a monotonic function of ft. This property will allow us to pin down
uniquely the equilibrium exchange rate.
Note thatΛt also contains the robust forecast of the unobservable state Ft(xt+1;qt).
This is because in order to solve Problem (4.10), the agent must have a robust
estimate of next period’s exchange rate Ft(ft+1). Recall that under the uncertain
model, Ft(ft+1)=−yt+1 − aφt+1Ft(xt+1)+ut+1, where ut+1 is an unknown dis-
turbance. Thus, to fully characterize the Qt-set the agent needs to have a robust
estimate of next period’s state. The next proposition provides such an estimate.
Proposition 4.2. The agent’s robust forecast of the unobservable component of







19where ˆ xt+1 and Zt+1 are given by recursion (3.4).
Interestingly, Ft(xt+1;qt) contains ˆ xt+1 and Zt+1 which also appear in the up-
dating formulas of the benchmark economy. Recall that under the benchmark
model, ˆ xt+1 is the conditional expectation of the interest rate diﬀerential Et(yt+1),
and Zt+1 is the variance of this estimate. The formal similarity of the two fore-
casting formulas is noteworthy, given the diametrically diﬀerent speciﬁcations of
uncertainty.
In contrast to standard rational expectations estimates of latent variables,
robust estimates are functions of the portfolio chosen by the investor. Equation
(4.12) says that if the agent is long in the domestic bond (qt > 0), his H∞ forecast
about the forward premium is more pessimistic than the rational expectations
forecast. In contrast, his H∞ forecast would be more bullish if he were short
(qt < 0).18
An attractive property of the model is that if the agent does not care about
robustness, the H∞ and rational expectations forecasts are equal: if we let γt+1 →
∞, (4.12) equals the Kalman ﬁlter (3.4).
4.6. Solution to Problem O/R
Proposition 4.1 has deﬁned the Qt-set in terms of a quadratic equation that de-
pends only on observable variables. The solution to Problem O/R is now straight-
forward. Namely, if expected excess returns are positive, the agent buys as much
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Expectations are formed under the probabilistic model. That is, agents com-
pute Et(ρt+1,f t) under the view that the interest rate diﬀerential is generated by
18Note that in any equilibrium qt = S. Thus, along any equilibrium path the robust forecast
is Ft(xt+1;S): =Ft(xt+1).
20the benchmark process (3.1) with known probability distribution. Moreover, they
know the model that generates future exchange rates (4.8).
Note that if the RC were totally relaxed for all periods, the Qt-set would
always be unbounded and the expectations operator would be the same as in the
benchmark economy. Thus, the solution of Problem O/R would coincide with
that of problem O in the benchmark economy.
4.7. Markov Equilibria
In a ‘Markov equilibrium’ the exchange rate depends only on the current value of yt
and the current estimate of the state (Et(xt+1) or Ft(xt+1)). The next Proposition
identiﬁes conditions on parameters under which a Markov equilibrium exists and it
exhibits the exchange rate function in closed form. The proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 4.3 (Markov Equilibria). Consider a mixed O/R economy.
• There exist ME along which expected excess returns can be diﬀerent from
zero if the Qt-set is bounded (Γt+1 > 0) and the domestic bond’s supply
satisﬁes |S| > |St(yt)| for some t. The exchange rate function is f∗
T(yT)=
fE
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≤ 0, Γt+1 > 0 and q
t(f
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t (yt) and the threshold St are given by (4.15), (4.16) and
(7.13a), respectively. The conjectures that support this equilibrium are (4.3)
and (4.8) with ψ
∗
1,t = ϕ∗











• If Γt+1 ≥ 0 and |S|≤| St(yt)| for all t, a Markov equilibrium need not exist.
• If Γt+1 < 0 for all t, there are zero excess returns in all ME and the exchange
rate is given by (3.5).
This Proposition demonstrates the existence of equilibria along which there
can be some periods during which there are non-zero predictable excess returns.
In the next section we will impose further parameter restrictions that will ensure
the existence of either negative or positive predictable excess returns on a given
21time interval. This will allow us to rationalize the forward premium puzzle and
delayed overshooting.
In the remainder of this subsection we provide an heuristic derivation of Propo-
sition 4.3. In equilibrium, taking the exchange rate ft as given, agents choose
q∗
t(ft,yt) according to (4.13), and the market for domestic bonds clears. The key
point is that the exchange rate has two functions: it determines the boundary
of the Qt-set as well as the sign of expected excess returns. In order to ensure




t ,yt)=S and Et(ρt+1,f∗
t ) ≥ 0; (ii) qγ
t(f∗
t ,yt)=S and Et(ρt+1,f∗
t ) ≤ 0; or
Et(ρt+1,f∗




It follows that a necessary condition for expected excess returns to be diﬀerent
from zero is that the Qt-set is non-empty and either its lower or upper boundary
is ﬁnite. Since the Qt-set is deﬁned by a quadratic equation (i.e., (4.11)), this
condition holds only if Γt+1 ≥ 0. Otherwise, ¯ qt(ft,y t)=∞ and q
t(ft,yt)=−∞
for all ft.
Figure A, drawn for the case Γt+1 > 0 and S>0, helps understand the
intuition. The Qt-set is composed of all q￿
ts such that the parabola J(qt,ft)=0
is non-positive. When Γt+1 > 0, this parabola is strictly convex. Thus, the the
Qt-set is connected and its two boundaries are ﬁnite. They are equal to the real
roots of J(qt,f t)=0 .19 Note that by varying ft we generate a family of parabolas
that intersect only once: at the vertical axis. Since an increase in ft makes the
parabola rotate clockwise, there is a unique exchange rate (call it f
H∞
t (yt)) for
which a boundary of the Qt-set equals S.
The fact that there is a function f
H∞
t (yt) that equalizes a boundary of the
Qt-set to S does not mean that f
H∞
t (yt) belongs to an equilibrium. In addition
we need to ensure that when the upper(lower) boundary is equal to S, the agent is
willing to demand as much(little) as possible of the domestic bond (i.e., expected
excess returns must be non-negative(non-positive) if ft = f
H∞
t ). Can we determine
which boundary of the Qt-set will equal S? The answer is yes. It is evident from
Figure A that at each point in time only one of the boundaries of the Qt-set can





t ,yt) = S. In contrast, if S ≤ St(yt), then qγ
t(f
H∞
t ,yt) = S.
It follows that when Γt+1 > 0 the exchange rate function f
H∞
t (yt) belongs to
an equilibrium if either (i)S ≥ St(yt) and Et(ρt+1,f
H∞
t ) ≥ 0; or (ii)S<S t(yt)
19This equation has real roots if and only if Λt(ft)2 ≥ Mt+1Γt+1. If this condition is violated,
the Rt-set is empty.
22and Et(ρt+1,f
H∞
t ) ≤ 0. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that either of these
conditions will be satisﬁed. In principle, there may be some histories yt for which
the sign of expected excess returns might be the opposite of what is required in
(i) or (ii). To ensure market clearing at all times, it is necessary (although not
suﬃcient) to introduce a second auxiliary exchange rate function, fE
t (yt), with the
property that expected excess returns under the probabilistic model are zero (i.e.,
Et(ρt+1,fE
t )=0 ) . This is why Proposition 4.3 allows the equilibrium exchange
rate be equal to either f
H∞
t (yt) or fE
t (yt).
Proposition 4.3 requires that |S| > |St(yt)| when Γt+1 ≥ 0 to ensure that the
supply of the domestic bond S belongs to the Qt-set. This, in turn, ensures that
exchange rate function (4.14) induces market clearing at all times. To see why
this is so consider the case S>S t(yt) > 0 illustrated in panel (a) of Figure B,
and denote by fa
t the exchange rate associated with the parabola that crosses the






t is part of an equilibrium because the
agent sets his demand for the domestic bond equal to the upper boundary of the
Qt-set, which is equal to the supply: q∗
t = ¯ q
γ
t (fa






0, let the equilibrium exchange rate be fb




t ,t h efb
t-parabola is obtained by rotating the fa
t -parabola clockwise, and
S is in the interior of the set Q
γ
t (yt,fb
t). Combining this with the fact that the
agent is indiﬀerent about the value of q∗
t if expected excess returns are zero, we
conclude that fb
t belongs to an equilibrium. That is, any S>S t(yt) > 0 belongs






< 0 and f∗
t (yt)=fE
t (yt). The reader can
verify that the same argument can be made for the case S<S t(yt) ≤ 0.
To see why a Markov equilibrium may not exist if |S|≤| St(yt)| for some t,
consider panel (b) of Figure B. Now fa
t is the exchange rate that makes the lower
bound of the Qt-set equal to S (i.e., qγ
t(fa





> 0, we cannot
set the exchange rate at a more appreciated level (i.e., fb
t <f a
t ) to ensure zero
expected excess returns and still clear the market. This is because the relevant
portion of the fb
t -parabola would lay above the fa
t -parabola. Thus, S would not




It is straightforward to derive the functions f
H∞
t (yt) and fE
t (yt). Since the
conjecture of future exchange rates that the representative agent uses to generate
the Qt-set is given by (4.3)-(4.4), it can be veriﬁed that for t<T ,f
H∞



































The second line in (4.15) follows by replacing Ft(xt+1) by (4.12). It is impor-
tant that we can represent f
H∞
t (yt) in two equivalent ways in order to show that
the two consistency requirements are satisﬁed. To determine fE
t (yt) recall that
since expectations are computed under the probabilistic model, (4.9) implies that
fE
t (yt)=αt+1Et( ˜ f
H∞
t+1 )+[ 1− αt+1]Et( ˜ fE
t+1) − yt. Using conjecture (4.8) and im-
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βT t = T
As a closing remark, note that when constructing the Qt-set the representative
agent knows that f∗
t+1(yt+1) will be given by either (4.15) or (4.16). However,
he is not sure which function will realize at t +1and about the process that
generates yt+1. Since he is using a robust method, he does not represent this
uncertainty in a probabilistic way (i.e., using the sequence αt and (3.1)). Instead,
he considers process (4.1) for yt+1 and his forecast about next period’s forecast of
the unobservable state is given by (4.4). He then represents t +1’s exchange rate
with ˜ fu
t+1(yt+1) deﬁned in (4.3).
Figure 1 illustrates the performance of a portfolio under the benchmark ra-
tional expectations economy of Section 3 and the mixed economy of this section.
The graphs in Figure 1 summarize the results of the simulations we describe in
the appendix. For each period, panel (a) depicts the worst performance, across






h] . As we can see, according to this cri-
terion, at all times the normalized excess returns are greater under the mixed
24economy than in the rational expectations economy. That is, for all t the index
He
t+1 corresponding to the mixed economy lays below the corresponding index for
the rational expectations economy. The same pattern is observed in panel (b),
which depicts the worst performance, across simulations, of the diﬀerence between
the indexes of desired returns and realized returns m −S[ft − ft+1 + yt].
5. Rationalizing Foreign Exchange Market Anomalies
In this section we will show that if there is a time interval in which the exchange
rate is determined by the upper boundary of the Qt-set (i.e., f∗
t = f
H∞
t ), then it
is possible to rationalize the anomalies mentioned in the Introduction. When this
occurs positive expected excess returns exist in equilibrium, and it is possible to
generate a negative Fama regression coeﬃcient, as well as unconditional delayed
overshooting.
Although Proposition 4.3 characterizes an equilibrium along which expected
excess returns can be non-zero, it does not specify the conditions under which
there is a given time interval during which expected excess returns will actually
be either positive or negative. In this section we provide suﬃcient conditions
for expected excess returns to be strictly positive or negative on a given time
interval. The suﬃcient condition is that S be large and that required robustness
(γ
−1
t ) decreases over time:
γt+1 = gγt,g > 1 (5.1)
We can think of a market where agents are initially very uncertain about what
is the ‘true model,’ and they try to be very robust against ‘unknown misspeciﬁ-
cations’. Over time, required robustness is reduced and eventually converges to
zero. As a result, ceteris paribus, the size of the Qt-set increases allowing agents to
better exploit the proﬁt opportunities that their benchmark model indicates exist.
This view is consistent with the notion that investors tend to be very cautious
when investing in new markets. Over time the degree of conservatism declines.
There is a deeper issue: what determines the level of γt? This we leave for
future research.
The following Proposition exhibits an equilibrium along which there is a time
interval in which the RC binds (so f∗
t = f
H∞
t ) and expected excess returns are
guaranteed to be strictly positive.
25Proposition 5.1 (Switching Equilibrium). If the degree of robustness (γ
−1
t )
decreases fast enough and the bond’s supply S>0 is large enough, there exists
a switching time τ>0 such that, for all t<τ<¯ τ the equilibrium exchange











Meanwhile, for t ≥ τ, the exchange rate is given by (4.14). The upper bound on
the switching time is





















This Proposition is a special case of Proposition 4.3. It says that as long as
none of the events listed in ¯ τ’s deﬁnition has occurred, f∗
t (yt) is determined by the
Qt-set’s upper boundary. However, once one of these events occurs f∗
t (yt) reverts
to the function deﬁned in Proposition 4.3, where expected excess returns can have
any sign.
The intuition for why expected excess returns will be positive during a long
time interval is as follows. An increasing path for γt means that required robust-
ness falls over time. This implies that, ceteris paribus, the upper boundary of the
Qt-set will increase. As a result, the t +1demand for domestic bonds will be
greater than the demand at time t. Since the supply of the domestic bond is ﬁxed,
the t +1exchange rate will have to appreciate (i.e., ft+1 <f t). If this expected
appreciation is big enough, expected excess returns at time t will be positive.
Agents at time t know that at t +1the demand for the domestic bond will be
set at the upper boundary of the Qt+1-set because they know that γt+2 >γ t+1.
Equation (5.3) below makes precise the conditions on g and S under which this
arguments holds.
We would like to note that since γt grows over time, if terminal time T is large
enough, the equilibrium exchange rate function will converge to the standard
rational expectations formula (3.5). This is an attractive property of the model.
Proposition 5.1 follows directly from Proposition 4.3. Suppose that at any
t ≤ τ the exchange rate is f
H∞
t (yt) as given by (4.15). Since S ≥ St, the represen-
tative agents sets his demand for domestic bonds equal to the upper boundary of







It is straightforward to compute this expectation because along the equilibrium
characterized by Proposition 5.1, αt+1 =1 . That is, at t +1the exchange rate









t − Et(˜ f
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t+1 (ϕ∗




















Note that (5.3) has been derived under the probabilistic model. That is, agents




the benchmark model for the interest rate diﬀerential (3.1). Then, using Bayes’
updating equation (3.4), agents set Et(yt+1)=ˆ xt+1 and Et(ˆ xt+2)=aˆ xt+1.




t+1 ), it is necessary that expected excess returns at t+1be non-negative. Here is
where the decreasing robustness requirement kicks in: if g is high enough, the term
in brackets is positive for all t. This term can be negative only if Zt+1 <g −2Zt+2.
Recall that Zj is given by the Kalman ﬁlter and it converges at a decreasing rate





w. Thus, it is suﬃcient to set g2 >
Z1
Z0 to
ensure that [ζt−g−2ζt+1] is positive for all t>0. Furthermore, since the ﬁrst term
in (5.3) is increasing in S, while the second is decreasing in S, there is a positive
switching time τ such that (5.3) is positive if t<τ−1 and S is large enough.
Consider now period t = τ − 1. Since the exchange rate will be given by









τ ζτ−1S − ψ3t. From the deﬁnition of τ, it follows that this expression is
non-negative.
5.1. The Forward Premium Puzzle
The typical ‘Fama regression’ regresses the exchange rate depreciation on the
forward premium
ft+1 − ft = β0 + βfamayt + εt (5.4)
Since the uncovered interest parity condition (3.3) holds in standard rational ex-
pectations models, like that of Section 3, the estimate of βfama should not be
statistically diﬀerent from one (ˆ βfama =1 ) .20
The forward premium puzzle is that in almost all data sets the estimates of
βfama are less than one, and in many cases they are negative. A negative ˆ βfama
implies that there is a negative covariance between exchange rate changes and the
20The estimate of β0 might be diﬀerent from zero if agents are risk averse.
27forward premium (i.e., cov(ft+1 − ft,y t) < 0). This is puzzling because it means,
for instance, that when the U.S. interest rate is above the German one, the Dollar
tends to appreciate relative to the Mark.
In this subsection we investigate whether the exchange rate process (5.2) can
generate negative coeﬃcients in the Fama regression.
In the simulations shown in Figures 1 and 2 artiﬁcial forward premium se-
quences (yt) are generated using the benchmark process (3.1). For each of the
hundred forward premium sequences we compute two exchange rate sequences
(ft): one corresponding to the rational expectations model (3.5) and the other
corresponding to the mixed economy (3.5). In both cases the agent uses the para-
meters of the data generating process (a,σv,σ w) to make forecasts. That is, there
is no missperception in either the benchmark model or the probabilistic model.
Figure 1 graphs ft+1 − ft against yt. Panel (a) corresponds to the benchmark
model in which uncovered interest parity holds and the exchange rate is given by
(3.5). As expected, one can see a positive correlation between the two variables.
Panel (b) corresponds to the exchange rate characterized in Proposition 5.1, in
which required robustness falls over time. Here we can see a negative correlation
between ft+1 − ft and yt.
Figure 2 plots the estimates of βfama that correspond to each of the 100 sim-
ulations. In Panel (a), which corresponds to the rational expectations model, a
majority of ˆ β
re
fama’s are in a neighborhood of one (the average estimate is +0.843).
In contrast, a majority of ˆ β
mixed
fama’s corresponding to our mixed model are negative
(the average estimate is −0.301!).
The exchange rate process (3.5) in Proposition 5.1 can generate positive ex-
pected excess returns and a negative βfama because agents set their demand for
the domestic bond at the upper boundary of the Qt-set at all times, and this
boundary is increasing (on average) over time. This is because the degree of
required robustness is declining (i.e., γt is increasing).
We would like to note that an increasing γt is not necessary for positive and
time-varying expected excess returns. Recall that Proposition 4.3 tells us that
even when γt is constant, there are equilibria in which expected excess returns are
positive if S is suﬃciently large. The additional restrictions on S and the growth
of γt imposed in Proposition 5.1 make the simulations simpler because they ensure
that expected excess returns will be strictly positive on a certain time interval.
285.2. Delayed Overshooting
Another anomaly is the so called delayed overshooting puzzle. Under rational ex-
pectations, an increase in the U.S. interest rate induces an immediate appreciation
of the Dollar. If the interest rate is expected to mean-revert, the exchange rate
must overshoot at impact in order to generate expected depreciation along the
transition path and ensure that the uncovered interest parity condition is satis-
ﬁed. Eichenbaum and Evans (1985) have found that the typical impulse response
of exchange rates to a monetary shock does not follow this path. Instead, after the
initial appreciation the exchange rate continues to appreciate for several months
in response to a contractionary monetary shock that increases the interest rate
diﬀerential.
Figure 3 depicts three impulse response functions (IRF) to an interest rate
shock, associated with exchange rate function (3.5). As we can see, the uncon-
ditional IRF has the hump shape found by Eichenbaum and Evans (1985) and
others.
The IRF to a persistent shock of size δ ( f
pers
t ) is generated by feeding into
exchange rate function (5.2) the interest rate diﬀerential sequence generated by
a persistent shock of size w0 =
δ
σw. Similarly, the IRF to a transitory shock
(ftr
t ) is generated by setting the transitory shock v1 =
δ
σv. Lastly, the IRF to an













Figure 3 graphs the average across 100 simulations of these functions.
6. Review of the Literature
Robust Control has been a very active area of research since the 1980s. The point
of departure of the robust approach is the recognition that even in physics there
is no such thing as the correct model. Thus, one has to recognize that inevitably
any model has some misspeciﬁcation, and representing it in a probabilistic way
does not guarantee robustness.
Robust Control was developed in order to tackle control problems in which
attaining some sort of ‘guaranteed performance’ is important. This stands in
contrast to stochastic optimal control that takes an ‘on the average’ approach.
There are several approaches to robust control, like for instance H∞-control, risk-
29sensitive control, and minimum entropy.21 While theH∞ framework is appropriate
to ensure robust stability, it might entail some sacriﬁce in performance. Therefore,
a continuing research eﬀort has sought to bring an optimality criterion back to
the picture and combine it with robust considerations. Such a framework is the so
called ‘mixed H2/H∞ control.’ The basic problem considered is that of choosing
a control policy in order to minimize an upper bound of the expected loss under
the assumption that the disturbances are Gaussian (the H2-norm), subject to
the constraint that the controlled system satisﬁes a robustness constraint under
the assumption that the disturbances are square summable (the H∞-norm). See
Bernstein and Haddad (1989), Khargonekar and Rotea (1991), and Zhou, Glover,
Bodenheimer, and Doyle (1994).
The approach of this paper is similar to the mixed H2/H∞ approach. We
use H∞-control techniques to characterize the admissible portfolio set, not to
determine the optimal portfolio policy. We then allow agents to choose a portfolio
to maximize their expected utility under a probabilistic model, subject to the
portfolio belonging to the admissible set. The advantage of this mixed approach
is that it does not force agents to be overly conservative.
In economics, the notion that not all uncertainty can be parametrized in a
probabilistic way goes back to Knight (1921), who distinguished between quan-
tiﬁable ‘risks’ and unknown ‘uncertainties’. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) present
an axiomatic decision making framework where this distinction is made. Ep-
stein and Schneider (2001) extend this framework to a dynamic setup. Dow and
Ribeiro (1992), Epstein and Wang (1994), and Epstein and Zin (1989) have used
this framework to analyze investment decisions and asset pricing. Recently, Lars
Hansen and Tom Sargent have considered the robust control approach in eco-
nomics. See for instance Hansen, Sargent and Tallarini (1999) and Hansen, Sar-
gent and Wang (2000). The latter paper, as well as Tornell (2000) share with
the present paper the fact that there is a latent variable that determines agents’
payoﬀs, and agents must estimate it using available information.
The forward premium puzzle has been documented for many data sets over
diﬀerent countries and time periods. Surveys are provided by Lewis (1995) and
Engel (199X).
The delayed overshooting puzzle was documented by Eichenbaum and Evans
(1985). Gourinchas and Tornell (2000) have shown that this puzzle can be ra-
tionalized by invoking another puzzle present in the data: there is a systematic
21Basar and Bernhard (1995) and Zhou, Doyle and Glover (1996) are excellent references.
30missperception in the forecasts of interest rate diﬀerentials. The forecasts implic-
itly assume that shocks are more transitory than what they actually are. The
results in this paper suggest that there is a sense in which this missperception can
be rationalized in a setup where agents try to be robust against misspeciﬁcation.
7. Appendix
Derivation of (3.5).
For t = T,(3.2) and (3.3) imply that fB
t (yT)=βT −yT. Thus, the consistency
requirement is satisﬁed if and only if b∗
3,T = βT,b 1,T = −1, and b∗
2,T = 0. For t =






1,T−1 = −1, and b∗
2,T−1 = −1. Since Et(yt+1)=ˆ xt+1 and Et+1(ˆ xt+2)=aˆ xt+1,
(3.3) implies that for any t<T− 1,f B






2,t+1]ˆ xt+1 − yt. It follows that the consistency requirement fB





t) holds for all t ≤ T if and only if b∗
3,t = Et(b∗
3,t+1),b ∗




2,T = 0. This implies b∗
2,t = 1−aT−t
1−a .￿
Proof of Proposition 4.1.
Throughout this proof we will denote the state’s and interest rate diﬀerential’s
trajectories generated by the disturbance subsequence υs := {wj,v j}s
j=0 as follows:
xs = Xs(υ
s−1), ys = Ys(υ
s),s ≥ 1 (7.1)
























= yj, ∀ j ≤ s
￿
(7.2)
That is, Ωs is the set of square summable disturbance sequences {υj}
t+1
j=0 that are
compatible with history {yj}s
j=1.
For any sequence {yj}s
j=1 ￿= 0 the robustness constraint is satisﬁed if and
only if J(qt,f t) ≤ 0, deﬁned by problem (4.10). We will derive J(qt,f t) following
the same procedure as Tornell (2000). First, we will assume temporarily that
the unobservable state xt+1 takes a speciﬁc value x, and break problem (4.10) in
two parts: the ‘cost-to-come function’ that considers the terms in (4.10) indexed
j = 0,...,t; and the ‘cost-to-go function’ that includes the terms with j = t +1 .
31Then, we determine the H∞ estimate of the state Ft(xt+1).
Cost-to-come value function













subject to xt+1 = x
(7.3)
The only information an agent has about the disturbances {υj}t
j=0 is that they
are square summable sequences, and that they have been generated by a dividend
history {yj}t
j=1 according to the dynamic system (4.1). The solution to (7.3) is
an intermediate step that allows the agent to estimate xt+1. It characterizes the
disturbance sequences that make (4.10) less likely to hold, given that they bring
the state from x0 = 0 to xt+1 = x, and are consistent with history. We will
derive Wt+1(x) by representing (7.3) as a recursive problem. In order to do this
let Ωs(x|ys) be the set of admissible disturbance sequences that bring the state to





υ ∈ Ωs | x = Xs(υ
s−1)
￿
, s ∈ {1,...,t} (7.4)
Analogously to (7.3) we can deﬁne the cost-to-come value function, conditional















,s ∈ {1,...,t} (7.5)













x = asξ + σww
ys = ξ + σvv







Note that (ξ,w,v)corresponds to (xs,w s,v s)and that xcorresponds to xs+1. For-
ward dynamic programing problems are solved in a similar way to standard back-
32ward DP problems. The diﬀerence is that they are solved starting at the initial
time, not the terminal time. To solve problem (7.6) we need to ﬁnd a closed
form solution for the value function Ws+1(x). Since Ws+1(x) is the supremum of
a quadratic function subject to an aﬃne constraint, it is quadratic in x. The next
Lemma, which is proved in Tornell (2000), provides the solution.
Lemma 7.1 (Cost-to-Come Value Function). For any γt+1 ∈ (0,∞) the so-
lution to (7.6) is
Ws+1(x)=−Ks+1[x − ˇ xs+1]
2 −ls+1,s ∈{ 1,...,t} (7.7)
where and (ˇ xs+1,K s+1,l t+1) satisfy the recursion: ˇ x1 =0 ,K 1 = γ2
t+1σ−2
w , l1 = 0;
and for s ∈ {1,...,t}






















v + Ks (7.8)















































The cost-to-go value function
Here we maintain the assumption that xt+1 = x and determine the H∞ forecast
of ωt+1 := (vt+1,w t+1,u t+1). In an H∞ setup even if an agent knew the value of
the unobservable state xt+1, he would not forecast that either yt+1 will be xt+1, or
that the time t +1 estimate of xt+2 will be aˆ xt+1. This is because in the presence
of misspeciﬁcation there is no reason to believe that the disturbance ωt+1 will be
identically zero. In fact the H∞ forecast of ωt+1 is dependent on the portfolio
chosen. This is formalized by the following problem in which the unobservable
state xt+1 is again assumed to take the value x.
Vt+1(x,qt,f t) = sup
ω∈Vx
￿
m − ρt+1qt − γ2
t+1[w2 + v2 + u2]
￿
subject to xt+1 = x
yt+1 = xt+1 + σvv
(7.10)
33The set of admissible strategies for the disturbance (i.e., Vx) consists of the Markov
strategies ωt+1 = ω(x,qt) with ω(·):R2 ￿−→ R 3.22 Three observations are in
order. First, a major simpliﬁcation relative to the original problem (4.10) is
that strategies are functions of (xt+1,q t), not of the entire history of observations
({yj,q j,f j}t
j=1). In this sub-problem agents make forecasts, acting as if the state
xt+1 takes the speciﬁc value x. Second, the disturbance ωt+1 has access to the
realization of qt in order to ensure robustness. Third, no hard bound has been
imposed on the disturbance ωt+1. As we shall see, if problem (7.10) has a solution,
the disturbance will be bounded in equilibrium.
In order to solve (7.10) we use (4.3) to make the substitution ρt+1 = ft−
[φ0 + φ1(x + σvv)+φ2t(ax + σww)+u]+ yt, where
φ0 =0 ,φ 1 = −1,φ 2t =
1 − aT−t
1 − a
Since the ﬁrst order conditions are suﬃcient for a maximum, replacing the opti-
mized value of ω in (7.10), it follows that the ‘cost-to-go value function’ is given
by
















where ¯ Λt(x) ≡ ft + yt − [φ1 + aφ2]x − φ0.
Determination of Ft(xt+1).
In order to determine the H∞ forecast of xt+1 and of the interest rate diﬀer-
ential Ft(yt+1) we use the following Theorem (see Tornell (2000) for a proof).23
Theorem 7.2. There exists a solution to Problem R if and only if there are
bounded functions Wt+1(x) and Vt+1(x), deﬁned by (7.5) and (7.10), which satisfy
sup
x
Υ(x): =s u p
x
{Vt+1(x)+Wt+1(x)} < ∞ (7.12)
22Markov strategies are also known as feedback strategies. These strategies are closed-loop
strategies in which history matters only through its eﬀect on the current state. See Basar and
Olsder (1995).
23This Theorem implies that one can determine whether an equilibrium exists by considering
only Markov equilibria (i.e., where strategies and exchange rates only depend on the estimate
of the state xt+1,y t and ft). If a Markov equilibrium does not exist, then there exists no other
equilibrium in which portfolio and disturbance strategies are more complicated functions of
history{yj}t
j=1. Note, however that this Theorem does not say that there is a unique equilibrium.
If a Markov equilibrium exists, there might exist other equilibria in which strategies have the
same open-loop representation as the Markov strategies.
34The feedback estimate of xt+1 is given by Ft(xt+1) = argmaxΥ(x). Furthermore,
if (7.12) holds and Υ(x) is strictly concave, Ft(xt+1) is unique.
The expression for Ft(xt+1) in (4.12) is obtained by replacing (7.7) and (7.11)
in (7.12), by making the change of variable Zt := γ
−2
t+1Kt, and by noting that
ˇ xt =ˆ xt, where ˆ xt is given by (3.4).24 ￿
Proof of Proposition 4.3.
In equilibrium, taking the exchange rate ft as given, agents choose q∗
t(ft,yt)
according to (4.13), and the market for domestic bonds clears: q∗
t(f∗
t ,yt)=S. We
will construct an equilibrium exchange rate function f∗




t (yt) deﬁned in (4.15) and (4.16), respectively.
Since f
H∞
t is an exchange rate that equalizes a boundary of the Qt-set to the




t ,yt)=S), equation (4.11) implies that f
H∞
t





t − Λt(ft)St + Mt+1. Since only Λt depends
on ft, it follows that f
H∞
t (yt) is given by (4.15).
In order to determine when is it that the function f
H∞
t (yt) can be part of an
equilibrium we need to answer the following questions: (i)when will the Qt-set be
non-empty, and its largest (¯ qt) and/or smallest (q
t) boundaries be ﬁnite? (ii)Is
there a unique f
H∞




t ,y t)=S? (iii)For a given S ∈ R, can
we determine whether the highest or the lowest boundary of the Qt-set equals S:
¯ qt(f
H∞
t ,yt) = S or qt(f
H∞
t ,yt)=S? The answer to the last question is important
because f
H∞





t ) ≥ 0, or q
t(f
H∞
t ;yt)=S and Et(ρt+1,f
H∞
t ) ≤ 0.
To answer these questions it is useful to refer to Figure A. For a given ft, (a)the
Qt-set is non-empty when the roots of J(qt;ft)=0are real, and (b) at least one of
the boundaries of the Qt-set is ﬁnite when J(qt;ft) is a convex function of qt. Since








t+1, (a) holds if
and only if Λt(ft)2 ≥ Γt+1Mt+1. Condition (b) holds if and only if Γt+1 ≥ 0, in
















24In general the kernel in (7.10) is an indeﬁnite quadratic form in ωt+1. Depending on the
value of γt+1, i tm i g h to rm i g h tn o tb ec o n c a v ei nωt+1. This is not the case here because the
numerator in the robustness constraint is linear.
35Note that if Γt+1 < 0, then ¯ qt(ft,yt)=∞ and qt(ft,y t)=−∞ for all ft and yt.
As we shall show, the answer to (ii) is in the aﬃrmative if S ￿=0 , and the answer
to (iii) depends on whether S is greater or smaller than a certain threshold St.
That is, ¯ qt(f
H∞
t ,yt) = S if S ≥ St, while q
t(f
H∞
t ,yt) = S if S ≤ St. In order to
determine St, we consider four cases.
Case i. (Γt+1 > 0 and Mt+1 > 0). Since Λt(f
H∞
t ) = 1
4Γt+1S +
Mt+1
S , the Qt-
set is non-empty if ft = f
H∞
t (yt).This is because minS[(Λt(f
H∞
t ))2] =Γ t+1Mt+1,
and so condition Λt(f
H∞
t ))2 ≥ Γt+1Mt+1 is satisﬁed for all S. When S>0, we
have that Λt(f
H∞
t ) > 0 and both ¯ qt(f
H∞
t ;yt) and q
t(f
H∞
t ;yt) are positive. Since
Λt is increasing in ft, it follows that ¯ qt is increasing in ft, while q
t is decreasing





t+1. Thus, there is a unique
f
H∞
t such that ¯ q(f
H∞





Similarly, there is a unique f
H∞
t such that q(f
H∞
t ,y t)=S>0 if and only if




t ). When S<0 we have that Λt(f
H∞
t ) < 0 and both
¯ qt(f
H∞
t ;yt) and q
t(f
H∞
t ;yt) are negative. Since now ¯ qt is decreasing in ft, while q
t










there is a unique f
H∞
t such that q(f
H∞





t ). Lastly, if S =0 , there does not exist an f
H∞
t .
Case ii. (Γt+1 > 0 and Mt+1 < 0). For all ft the roots of J(qt;ft)=0are
real and of opposite sign. Since J(0,f t) < 0 and the largest root is increasing in
ft, there is a unique f
H∞
t such that ¯ q(f
H∞
t ,y t)=S for any S>S t =0 . Similarly,
there is a unique f
H∞
t such that q(f
H∞
t ,y t)=S for any S<S t =0 . Lastly, if
S =0 , there does not exist an f
H∞
t .
Case iii. (Γt+1 > 0 and Mt+1 =0 ) . For all ft the roots of J(qt;ft)=0are
real; one root is zero, and the other 4Λt(ft)Γ
−1
t+1. Therefore, if S>0 and ft = f
H∞
t ,
the boundaries of the Qt-set are ¯ qt(f
H∞



















market clears: ¯ qt(f
H∞










t+1 = S. Lastly, if S = 0, any exchange rate clears the
market. In this case the threshold St equals zero.
Case iv. (Γt+1 =0 ) . In this case J(qt,f t) is linear in qt. Thus, at most
one of the boundaries of the Qt-set is ﬁnite. Since Λt(f
H∞





S qt + Mt+1. When S>0, ¯ q(f
H∞
t ) = S if Mt+1 < 0, while
q(f
H∞
t ) = S if Mt+1 > 0. When S<0, ¯ q(f
H∞
t ) = S if Mt+1 > 0, while q(f
H∞
t ) = S
if Mt+1 < 0. An f
H∞
t does not exist if either Mt+1 = 0 or S =0 .


























t+1. In cases ii and iii it is clear that St =0 .
Now, we derive fE
t (yt), which is deﬁned by Et(ρt+1,fE
t )=0 . Expectations are
computed under the probabilistic model: (3.1) and (4.8). In any equilibrium con-








t (yt; ˜ f
H∞
t+i , ˜ fE
t+1). Since f
H∞
t (yt) can be represented in two equiva-
lent ways (see (4.15)), the ﬁrst requirement is satisﬁed if ϕ1,t = −1 and ϕ2,t =
−φ(t): =−
1−aT −t
1−a . For the second requirement note that Proposition 4.3 ex-
hibits an equilibrium where αT = 0. This implies that for t ≥ T − 1 the func-
tions fE
t and ˜ fE











2,T−1 = −1, and
ψ
∗
3,T −1 = ET−1(ψ
∗
3,T). For t<T− 1, the uncovered interest parity condition
(3.3) implies fE
t = αt+1Et( ˜ f
H∞
t+1 )+[ 1−αt+1]Et(˜ fE








































ψ1t+1ˆ xt+1 + ψ2t+1aˆ xt+1 + ψ3t+1
￿
− yt















It follows from (4.8) that ˜ fE
t (yt)=fE
t (yt; ˜ fE
t+1, ˜ f
H∞






2,t = −1−aT −t
1−a and ψ
∗
3,t is given by (4.16). We obtain fE
t (yt) by replacing
the vector ψ
∗ in (4.8).
Now, we construct the equilibrium exchange rate function f∗
t (yt). It follows
37from the agent’s portfolio strategy (4.13) that we can set f∗







t ) ≥ 0, or q
t(f
H∞
t ;yt)=S and Et(ρt+1,f
H∞
t ) ≤
0. If neither of these conditions is satisﬁed, we can set f∗
t (yt) equal to fE
t (yt), pro-
vided that S ∈ Q
γ




t ,y t) if ¯ qt(f
H∞
t ;yt)=S and Et(ρt+1,f
H∞







t ;yt)=S and Et(ρt+1,f
H∞




J-parabola in Figure B would shift upwards.
Lastly, we verify that under the uncertain model the disturbance sequences






















Clearly, for any ﬁnite T these sequences are square summable.￿
Simulations
The simulations corresponding to Figures 1-4 are done using the following
procedure. First, we draw I sequences of disturbances {wj,v j}
¯ T
j=0 from a standard
normal distribution, where I = ¯ T =1 0 0 . Then, for each disturbance sequence, we
generate an artiﬁcial interest rate diﬀerential sequence {yj}
¯ T
j=1 using the following
process: yj = xj + σvvj,x j+1 =( a +∆ a
j)xj + σwwj, where x0 =0 ,a=0 .9345,
σ2
v =0 .05882 and σ2
w =0 .50756. For Figure 1 the misspeciﬁcation ∆a
j is drawn
from a normal distribution: N(0.035,0.0122). For Figures 2-4 we set ∆a
j =0 .
We generate the interest rate diﬀerential forecasts for the benchmark and




t ) using the formulas in the text by setting S =1 0 ,m=9 ,
γ0 = 1.14,g=1 .?,x 0 =0 ,a=0 .9345, σ2
v =0 .05882 and σ2
w =0 .50756. Since
converge takes place quite fast, we set for all j, Zj = Z (the converged value).










































j]}. In Figures 2-4 we we compute (fRE
j+1 −fRE
j and fH∞
j using (3.5) and
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39Figure 1: Realized Excess Returns Under Misspecication 




























































Note: The solid line corresponds to Benchmark Rational Expectations Economy. The
dotted line corresponds to the Mixed O=R Economy.
1Figure 2: Exchange Rate Depreciation and the Interest Rate Dierential
(a)Benchmark Rational Expectations Economy.























































2Figure 3: The Forward Discount Puzzle
For each simulated sequence of interest rate dierentials yi
j, we report the point estimate of i
in the regressionfi
j+1   fi
j = i + iyi
t + "i
t
(a)Benchmark Rational Expectations Economy.























































3Figure 4. Impulse Responses
fj associated with a persistent shock of size 
w at time 0















fj associated with a transitory shock of size 
v at time 1















fj associated with an unconditional shock















Note: The solid line corresponds to Benchmark Rational Expectations Economy. The dotted
line corresponds to the Mixed O=R Economy.
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